Do foreign lenders' national cultures affect loan pricing? by Pappas, Kostas & Xu, Alice Liang
1 
 
Do Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures Affect Loan Pricing? 
 
Kostas Pappas 
Assistant Professor of Accounting 
Management School, 
University of Liverpool 
Chatham Street, Liverpool,  
L69 7ZH, UK 
Tel: +44 (0)151-795-1219 
E-mail: k.pappas@liverpool.ac.uk  
 
Alice Liang Xu 
Assistant Professor of Accounting 
Alliance Manchester Business School 
University of Manchester 
Booth Street West, Manchester 
M15 6PB, UK 








Do Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures Affect Loan Pricing? 
 
 
Abstract: We examine the role of foreign lenders’ national cultures in the pricing of syndicated loans. 
Using Schwartz’s cultural dimensions, embeddedness and mastery, we find that foreign lenders 
domiciled in countries with higher embeddedness and mastery scores offer lower interest rates. These 
findings are robust to a battery of robustness tests and incremental to the effects of formal institutions. 
We also document that greater information asymmetry and foreign lenders’ bargaining powers 
strengthen the impact of the foreign lenders’ cultural values on loan pricing. An additional analysis 
shows that the intensity of loan covenants is also negatively related to the embeddedness and mastery 
scores of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile. Our findings suggest that cross-border debt 
contracting decisions are not only determined by objective judgments about risk and return but also 
depend on the subjective assertion of values and beliefs guided by informal institutions, such as cultural 
norms. Cultural values can nurture and shape economic incentives and perceptions of sophisticated 
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This study examines the impact of foreign lenders’ national cultures on loan pricing. Foreign 
banks are subject to higher information risk and expropriation risk than are their domestic 
counterparts (Buch, 2003; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011; Mian, 2003, 2006; Petersen & Rajan, 
2002; Vu, Do, & Skully, 2015). Their risk tolerance and appetite for compensation should play 
particularly important roles in the design of loan contract terms. We expect foreign lenders’ 
attitudes toward risk and compensation to be affected by the national cultures of their countries 
of domicile. Cultural values “serve as guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz, 1994, 
p.88). They affect almost every aspect of human life. North (1990) points out that culture in 
the form of an informal institution has an even stronger power than formal legal and political 
institutions in shaping individuals’ values, preferences, and incentives. Therefore, national 
culture is likely to play an important role in economic activities through its influence on market 
participants’ behaviors and decision making. 
Prior literature has established a link between cultural values and a range of bank 
activities, including accounting choices (Kanagaretnam, Lim, & Lobo, 2011, 2014), dividend 
policy (Zheng & Ashraf, 2014), risk taking (Ashraf, Zheng, & Arshad, 2016; Chircop, Fabrizi, 
Ipino, & Parbonetti, 2017; Mourouzidou-Damtsa, Milidonis, & Stathopoulos, 2017), stability 
(Carretta, Farina, Fiordelisi, Schwizer, & Lopes, 2015), and lending corruption (Zheng, El 
Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kwok, 2013). Our study extends this stream of research by investigating 
the impact of foreign banks’ national cultures on their design of loan contract terms. 
We capture national culture using Schwartz (1994)’s cultural dimensions. Schwartz 
classifies national culture into six value types consolidated into two dimensions: embeddedness 
and mastery. Embeddedness captures the extent to which individuals are viewed as entities 
embedded in a collective society. High embeddedness cultures prioritize harmonious group 
relationships, group interests, security, and public image. Mastery refers to the values that 
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promote active self-assertion to master, change, and exploit the natural and social environment. 
High mastery cultures accentuate individual success, capability, and taking control (Licht, 
Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2007). We expect the embeddedness scores of foreign lenders’ 
countries of domicile to have a negative impact on the interest rates that they charge, while 
mastery scores are likely to have two opposing effects on interest rates. 
Drawing on a sample of 1,221 syndicated loans extended by foreign banks to U.S. 
borrowers during the period of 1996-2017, we find that the foreign lenders from higher 
embeddedness countries charge lower interest rates. The mastery scores of the foreign lenders’ 
countries of domicile are also negatively related to the interest rates imposed. These findings 
are robust to controlling for a range of firm-specific and loan-specific characteristics 
documented to affect interest spreads by prior literature. We also include some country-specific 
control variables to capture the effects of the economic condition and credit market 
development of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile. Our conclusions still hold when we 
exclude loans with multiple lead arrangers, correct the sample selection bias with Heckman 
(1979) two-stage model, address the potential endogeneity concern with 2SLS analysis, include 
additional foreign lender-specific and foreign lender country-specific control variables, 
consider the effects of the formal institutions of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile, and 
adopt alternative culture measures. In addition, we document that the impact of the foreign 
lenders’ cultural values on interest spreads is more pronounced when the information 
asymmetry between the foreign lenders and the borrowers is higher and when the foreign 
lenders possess more bargaining powers. Finally, an additional analysis shows that both high 
embeddedness and high mastery cultures reduce the intensity of covenants imposed by foreign 
lenders. 
This study adds to the debt contracting literature. Compared with the sizable research 
on how borrower characteristics affect the design of loan terms (e.g., Bae & Goyal, 2009; Chan, 
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Chen, & Chen, 2013; Graham, Li, & Qiu, 2008; Lin, Officer, Wang, & Zou, 2013; Pan, Yue 
Wang, & Weisbach, 2017; Qian & Strahan, 2007; Valta, 2012), research focusing on lender 
characteristics has been relatively limited. The extant literature in this area has examined the 
role of lenders’ reputation (McCahery & Schwienbacher, 2010; Ross, 2010), competition 
(Bushman, Hendricks, & Williams, 2016; Lian, 2018), type (Demiroglu & James, 2015; Gatev 
& Strahan, 2009; Harjoto, Mullineaux, & Yi, 2006; Lim, Minton, & Weisbach, 2014), liquidity 
(Bord & Santos, 2014), and relationships within the lending group (Champagne & 
Kryzanowski, 2007; Panyagometh & Roberts, 2010; Wu, Chang, Suardi, & Chang, 2013). Our 
research complements this literature by providing original evidence for the effect of the 
informal institutions of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile. Moreover, we find that the 
effect of informal institutions on loan pricing is incremental to that of formal institutions, such 
as the legal environment.  
In addition, this study contributes to the culture-finance literature in general and the 
culture-banking literature in particular. A growing body of research has investigated the role 
of national culture in a variety of economic and capital market activities, for example, foreign 
investment (Aggarwal, Kearney, & Lucey, 2012; Guiso, Sapienza, & Zingales, 2009; Levis, 
Muradoǧlu, & Vasileva, 2016; Siegel, Licht, & Schwartz, 2011), mergers and acquisitions 
(Ahern, Daminelli, & Fracassi, 2015; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, & Jayaraman, 2009; 
Weber, Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996), capital structure (Chui, Lloyd, & Kwok, 2002; Gleason, 
Mathur, & Mathur, 2000; Li, Griffin, Yue, & Zhao, 2011), stock market participation, trading 
and momentum profits (Chui, Titman, & Wei, 2010; Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2001; Guiso, 
Sapienza, & Zingales, 2008), dividend policy (Bae, Chang, & Kang, 2012; Fidrmuc & Jacob, 
2010; Javakhadze, Ferris, & Sen, 2014; Shao, Kwok, & Guedhami, 2010), executive 
compensation (Bryan, Nash, & Patel, 2015; Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998), accounting practices 
and accounting systems (Chand, Cummings, & Patel, 2012; Doupnik & Richter, 2003; Gray, 
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1988; Perera, 1989), and earnings quality (Doupnik, 2008; Han, Kang, Salter, & Yoo, 2010; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2011; Nabar & Thai, 2007). In particular, some prior studies have 
provided evidence for the impact of cultural values on banking activities (e.g., Chircop et al., 
2017; Kanagaretnam et al., 2011, 2014; Zheng et al., 2013). Our study furthers this line of 
research by showing that the national cultures of the foreign banks’ countries of domicile play 
a significant role in the design of loan contract terms. Our findings suggest that culture matters 
even in the highly developed syndicated loan market with professional and experienced 
lenders. 
This paper is most closely related to Chui, Kwok, and Zhou (2016), who examine how 
the national cultures of the borrowers’ countries of domicile affect the cost of debt. A key 
feature that differentiates our study from theirs is that they focus on the borrowers’ cultural 
values, while we examine those of the lenders. They argue that the borrowers’ cultural values 
could affect the cost of debt through their impact on the borrowers’ default risk and agency 
costs. In contrast, we propose that the lenders’ cultural traits could affect the interest spreads 
that they charge by shaping the lenders’ perceptions of risk and compensation. Another 
difference between our study and Chui et al. (2016) is that they perform a country-level 
analysis, while our analysis is at the loan level. By aggregating data into country-year 
observations, the type, purpose, and characteristics of the debt are not controlled for in their 
study. However, these factors are well recognized as important determinants of the cost of debt, 
giving rise to a concern for omitted correlated variables. In contrast, by adopting loan-level 
observations, our study is able to address the effect of debt characteristics. In addition, in Chui 
et al. (2016), both the borrowers and the lenders are from multiple countries, while in our paper, 
the lenders are from multiple countries, but all of the borrowers are from the U.S. By 
constraining the borrower firms to those from one country, we eliminate the variations in the 
borrowers’ national cultures, legal environments, and market conditions. 
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Other studies that investigate the relationship between culture and debt contracting 
include Giannetti and Yafeh (2012) and Zhu and Cai (2014), who find that creditors impose 
less favorable contract terms on more culturally distant borrowers. Zheng, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, and Kwok (2012) document a relationship between borrower firms’ cultural scores 
and their debt maturity structures. He and Hu (2016) and Jiang, John, Li, and Qian (2018) 
provide evidence that U.S. borrowers located in counties with high levels of religiosity enjoy 
lower interest rates, larger loan amounts, and less intensive loan covenants. These studies focus 
on either how the culture difference between the borrower and the lender affects debt 
contracting through the information asymmetry channel or how the borrower’s cultural 
background affects debt contracting through the default risk and agency costs channel. In 
contrast, our paper explores the role of the lender’s cultural values. We expect the lender’s 
incentives and subjective perceptions of risk and compensation to be deeply rooted in their 
cultural values. In particular, since foreign banks are short for soft information and prior 
lending relationships with local firms compared with their domestic counterparts, their 
subjective perceptions should play a particularly important role in the decision making.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant literature 
and develops testable hypotheses. Section 3 describes the variables, methodology, and sample. 
Section 4 presents the empirical findings. Section 5 concludes the study. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
Embeddedness concerns desirable relationships between individuals and groups. Cultures with 
high embeddedness emphasize the person as embedded in the group and committed to 
maintaining the status quo, propriety, group solidarity, and traditional order (Licht et al., 2007; 
Schwartz, 1994). Chui et al. (2002) and Li et al. (2011) examine the impact of embeddedness 
on capital structure. They argue that firms in high embeddedness cultures use less debt because 
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these firms pursue harmonious relationships and are more concerned about the liquidation costs 
to their employees, suppliers, customers, and other stakeholders. High embeddedness also 
reduces the benefit of debt financing as a means for mitigating the agency conflict between 
shareholders and managers since the agency problem is less severe in high embeddedness 
societies, where people value group interests more than individual interests. In addition, public 
image is regarded as important in high embeddedness societies, and the use of debt incurs the 
risk of bankruptcy, which damages the firm’s public image. These papers also conjecture that 
embeddedness-oriented cultures advocate for security and might regard the excessive use of 
debt as too risky. Shao et al. (2010) document a positive relation between embeddedness and 
dividend payouts. They argue that shareholders in high embeddedness countries prefer 
receiving cash dividends to accumulating retained earnings because cash dividends are “bird 
in hand” and more secure. Moreover, high dividend payouts play a positive signaling role of 
firm performance and satisfy the demand to preserve one’s public image in high embeddedness 
countries. In addition, high dividend payouts reduce the agency problem between managers 
and shareholders and are therefore welcomed by high embeddedness cultures, which value 
harmonious group relationships. Chui et al. (2016) show that firms in high embeddedness 
countries enjoy a lower cost of debt. They explain this finding by the notion that the pursuit of 
security, public image, and group welfare in high embeddedness cultures decreases the 
borrower firms’ default risk. In addition, the emphasis on harmonious group relationships also 
reduces agency conflicts between borrower firms and creditors. 
Since the embeddedness culture places great importance on maintaining harmonious 
group relationships and calls for the sacrifice of individual interests to protect group interests, 
we expect foreign lenders from high embeddedness countries to be less aggressive in 
demanding high interest payments. In contrast, they are likely to be keener on fostering positive 
interactions and maintaining long-term relationships with borrower firms. Furthermore, since 
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the embeddedness culture stresses security, foreign banks from high embeddedness countries 
are likely to lend to less risky firms, leading to a negative correlation between the 
embeddedness scores of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile and the interest rates that 
they charge. Based on these arguments, we formulate the following testable hypothesis: 
 
H1: Foreign lenders from higher embeddedness countries charge lower interest rates. 
 
Mastery concerns the relationship between humankind and the natural and social world. 
Cultures with high mastery commit to actively modifying and exerting control over one’s 
surroundings, rather than accepting the natural and social world as it is. In these cultures, 
attributes such as self-assertion and getting ahead of others are valued (Licht et al., 2007; 
Schwartz, 1994). Chui et al. (2002) and Li et al. (2011) find that high mastery values reduce 
the use of debt. They suggest that high mastery cultures encourage managers to demonstrate 
their abilities by pursuing aggressive business strategies, and in this case, the managers are 
reluctant to be bound by debt covenants and lender monitoring. Moreover, high mastery 
cultures emphasize individual success. Since the event of default can be viewed as a failure of 
management, managers in high mastery countries are likely to avoid the excessive use of debt, 
which increases firms’ default risk. Shao et al. (2010) document a negative relationship 
between mastery and dividend payouts. They argue that managers from high mastery 
backgrounds like to maintain control, and by retaining cash in the company, they gain more 
flexibility and control over the business operations. In addition, the emphasis on success in 
high mastery societies also encourages managers to retain cash since internal cash is more 
efficient, economical, and timely than outside financing and can enhance a project’s 
profitability. Chui et al. (2016) propose that the mastery scores of borrower firms’ countries of 
domicile could have two opposing effects on their borrowing costs. On the one hand, managers 
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influenced by high mastery cultures would commit to achieving success and therefore avoiding 
the failure of bankruptcy. This commitment reduces the firms’ cost of debt by decreasing the 
default risk. On the other hand, high mastery cultures encourage managers to demonstrate their 
abilities by investing in risky projects, leading to increased default risk. Chui et al. (2016)’s 
empirical findings are consistent with high mastery scores in the borrower firms’ countries of 
domicile reducing the cost of debt. 
Since high mastery cultures accentuate individual success, foreign lenders from high 
mastery countries are likely to impose higher interest rates to maximize profitability. However, 
higher interest rates increase default risk. To the extent that nonperforming loans are regarded 
as an indication of failure, bank managers in pursuit of success are likely to avoid overly 
burdening the borrower with high interest rates. In addition, foreign lenders with high mastery 
backgrounds are likely to believe in their own capabilities and be less sensitive to risk, reducing 
the compensation that they require for risk. Moreover, since high mastery cultures emphasize 
exerting control, foreign lenders from high mastery countries are expected to address risk 
actively with intensive screening and monitoring, instead of high interest rates. There is no a 
priori evidence indicating which effect of the mastery culture would dominate. We, therefore, 
treat the impact of the foreign lenders’ mastery values on the interest rates that they charge as 
an empirical issue. Based on these arguments, we formulate the following testable hypothesis: 
 
H2a (b): Foreign lenders from higher mastery countries charge higher (lower) interest 
rates. 
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 Schwartz’s (1994) National Cultural Dimensions 
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Our study is closely related to Chui et al. (2016), who find an impact of borrower’s national 
culture measured with Schwartz’s (1994) dimensions on the cost of debt. Following Chui et al. 
(2016), we adopt the updated version of Schwartz’s (1994) survey-based national cultural 
scores to capture the foreign lenders’ cultural backgrounds.1 The survey is participated in by 
more than 15,000 urban elementary school teachers from 55 countries. The focus of the survey 
on school teachers corresponds to schools and teachers playing a crucial role in upholding and 
conveying cultural values in a socialized process over generations. In addition, by focusing on 
a single profession, the respondents’ characteristics, such as educational background, income, 
and age, are relatively consistent. This design also facilitates comparisons across countries 
(Licht et al., 2007; Siegel et al., 2011). Hofstede (2001, p. 8) regards Schwartz’s survey as the 
‘‘most extensive research project on values so far”. Moreover, Schwartz’s survey was 
conducted in the early 1990s, which is closer to our sample period than other cultural surveys, 
for example, the Hofstede survey, which was conducted in the early 1970s. 
Schwartz’s cultural scores include seven value types, which are further condensed into 
two broad dimensions: (1) embeddedness vs. affective and intellectual autonomy; and (2) 
mastery and hierarchy vs. egalitarian commitment and harmony. Consistent with prior 
literature (Chui et al., 2016; Chui et al., 2002; Li et al., 2011; Shao et al., 2010), we focus on 
embeddedness and mastery because these two dimensions capture all seven value types. 
 
3.2 Methodologies 
We estimate the following regression to examine the relationship between the foreign lenders’ 
national cultures and interest spreads: 
 





log(𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖,𝑡) = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐸𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠/𝑀𝑎𝑠𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑦𝑖 +  𝛼2 log(𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1)
+ 𝛼3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼4𝐼𝑛𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑣𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼5𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼6𝑀𝑎𝑟 𝑡𝑜 𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼7𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼8𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼9𝜎(𝑅𝑂𝐴)𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼10𝑍 − 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡−1
+ 𝛼11𝑀𝑎𝑟𝐶𝑜𝑛_𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼12 log(𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼13 log(𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖,𝑡)
+ 𝛼14𝐼𝑛𝑠𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼15𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑜𝑙𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼16𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼17𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼18𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼19 log(𝐿𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 𝑁𝑜.𝑖,𝑡 ) + 𝛼20𝑁𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼21 log(𝐺𝑒𝑜𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼22 log(𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛼23𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛼24𝑃𝑟𝑣𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼25 𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡 +  𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑃𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝐹𝐸 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝐹𝐸
+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐹𝐸 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                                                         (1) 
where the dependent variable, log(IntSpreadi, t), is the interest spread of loan i issued in year t 
measured as the annual spreads paid over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down from the loan. 
The test variables are Embeddedness and Mastery. For each loan i, they are measured 
with Schwartz’s (1994) culture scores of the foreign lead arrangers’ countries of domicile.2 For 
loans with multiple foreign lead arrangers domiciled in various countries, Embeddedness and 
Mastery are calculated as the average scores among those countries. We focus on the cultural 
values of the lead arrangers and disregard those of the participant lenders because the contract 
terms of syndicated loans are mainly negotiated and designed by the lead arrangers (Sufi, 
2007). Embeddedness and Mastery are constant over time since cultural values change slowly, 
often over the course of centuries (Hofstede, 1980; Licht, Goldschmidt, & Schwartz, 2005). 
 
2 Following Giannetti and Yafeh (2012), we assign to the lead bank the culture scores of the country 
where its headquarter is located. Since syndicated loans typically are for large amounts, the decision 
rights on contract terms are often in the hands of senior staff in the banks’ headquarters. Even when the 
loan contracts are written in local branches, they should follow the policies set by the headquarters. 




Hypothesis H1 predicts a negative coefficient on Embeddedness, while hypothesis H2a (H2b) 
predicts a positive (negative) coefficient on Mastery. 
We include a number of control variables commonly regarded as the determinants of 
loan spreads (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2011; Deng, Willis, & Xu, 2014; Ge, 
Kim, & Song, 2012; Graham et al., 2008; Hollander & Verriest, 2016; Valta, 2012). We first 
employ the natural logarithm of the borrower firm’s total assets (Log(Firm Size)) to capture the 
borrower size. Smaller firms are more informationally opaque, less capable of accessing 
external financing, and more vulnerable to distress. We expect smaller firms to incur higher 
interest spreads. We also control for the borrower firm’s performance, including solvency, 
liquidity, profitability, and volatility, using the firm’s leverage ratio (Leverage), interest 
coverage ratio (IntCov), current ratio (CurRatio), return on assets (ROA), and earnings 
volatility (σ(ROA)). Firms with higher leverage ratios and earnings volatility and lower interest 
coverage ratios, current ratios, and return on assets are subject to a greater risk of default. We 
expect them to borrow with higher interest rates. The market-to-book ratio (Mar to Book) 
captures the additional value over book assets that debt holders can access in the event of 
default. Firms with higher market-to-book ratios should enjoy a lower interest charge. Tangible 
assets can be sold more easily than intangible assets to recover the loan in the event of default. 
We expect firms with greater tangibility (Tangibility) to have more favorable interest rates. 
Altman (1968) Z-score (Z-score) is adopted to address the borrower firm’s distance from 
bankruptcy. Since a higher Z-score indicates a lower likelihood of bankruptcy, we predict a 
negative relationship between Z-score and loan pricing. These firm variables are all estimated 
at the end of the fiscal year immediately prior to loan initiation (year t-1). 
In addition, we control for the market condition of the borrower country in the month 
of loan initiation (MarCon_US), measured with a principal component analysis combined 
metric based on three different macroeconomic factors: (1) the difference between the yields 
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on Moody’s BAA and AAA-rated corporate bonds; (2) the difference between the yields on 
ten-year government securities and the three-month Treasury Bill; and (3) yields on three-
month Treasury Bill. A higher value indicates worse market conditions. We anticipate a 
positive coefficient on MarCon_US in the interest spreads regression since the market-wide 
default risk increases in recessions. 
Along with firm-specific characteristics, we also include a series of loan-specific 
variables in the regressions. First, we control for the natural logarithm of loan maturity 
(Log(Maturity)). Loans with longer maturities expose banks to firm financial conditions for 
longer periods; therefore, these loans should be charged with higher interest rates. We also 
control for the size of the loan, measured by the natural logarithm of the loan amount (Log(Loan 
Size)). We predict a negative relationship between loan size and interest spreads due to the 
economies-of-scale effect in lending (Berger & Udell, 1990). InstLoan is a dummy variable 
indicating whether the loan is funded by institutional investors. Institutional loans are typically 
extended to riskier borrowers. Thus, we expect them to have higher interest spreads than bank 
loans. Revolver is a dummy variable indicating whether the loan is a revolving loan. Andre, 
Mathieu, and Zhang (2001) provide evidence that banks bear a lower risk by issuing lines of 
credit than term loans. We, therefore, expect Revolver to be inversely related to interest spreads. 
Another dummy variable that we employ is PPP, which indicates whether the loan includes a 
performance pricing provision (PPP). Under PPPs, interest rates are directly tied to a 
prespecified measure of the borrower’s credit quality. We expect the presence of PPPs to 
reduce interest rates since PPPs mitigate agency problems in lending (Asquith, Beatty, & 
Weber, 2005; Panyagometh, Roberts, Gottesman, & Beyhaghi, 2013) and play a signaling role 
(Manso, Strulovici, & Tchistyi, 2010). We further address the effect of the lead arranger’s 
reputation by including a dummy variable, LeadRep, to capture whether the loan is arranged 
by one of the top 25 lead arrangers in the U.S. syndicated loan market, based on market share. 
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Prior literature has asserted that the reputation of the lead bank plays a certification role in the 
bank’s screening and monitoring abilities, which brings down the adverse selection and moral 
hazard problems within the syndicate and in turn lowers the interest charge required by the 
participant lenders (Bushman & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2012; Chaudhry & Kleimeier, 2015; 
Do & Vu, 2010; Godlewski, Sanditov, & Burger‐Helmchen, 2012; Ross, 2010). PreRelation 
indicates whether the lead arranger of the loan has led the borrower’s prior loans within the 
previous five-year period. Repeated lending, on the one hand, attenuates the information 
asymmetry between borrowers and lenders (Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, & Srinivasan, 2007). 
On the other hand, it exacerbates the hold-up problem (Rajan, 1992; Sharpe, 1990). It is 
therefore uncertain what the net effect of prior lending relationships on interest rates would be. 
The natural logarithm of the number of lenders involved in a loan syndicate (Log(Lender No.)) 
is also included as a control variable. The larger the number is, the more spread out the risk is 
among the involved lenders. Hence, an inverse relationship between the number of lenders and 
interest spreads is anticipated. We include a dummy variable, NonDollar, to capture whether 
the loan is a dollar or non-dollar denominated loan. We don’t have a prediction on the impact 
of this variable on the interest rate. The natural logarithm of geographical distance 
(Log(GeoDist)) between the borrower’s headquarter and the foreign lead’s headquarter in 
kilometers according to the Vincenty (sphere) method is included to capture the information 
asymmetry between the foreign lender and the borrower. According to sizable research (e.g., 
Agarwal & Hauswald, 2010; Coval & Moskowitz, 2001; Giannetti & Laeven, 2012), 
information risk increases with geographical distance. Hence, Log(GeoDist) should be 
positively related to interest spreads. All of the loan variables are estimated at loan initiation 
(year t). 
Another set of control variables are related to the characteristics of the foreign lead 
arrangers’ countries of domicile. We first address the effect of the economic environment using 
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the natural logarithm of GDP per Capita (Log(GDP per Capita)), annual GDP growth rate 
(GDP Growth), and inflation rate (Inflation). Prior literature (e.g., Giannetti & Laeven, 2012; 
Peek & Rosengren, 1997) has documented that foreign banks encountering economic turmoil 
in their home countries restrict their credits in host countries, exerting upward pressure on 
interest rates. We, therefore, expect Log(GDP per Capita) and GDP Growth to be negatively 
associated with and Inflation to be positively associated with interest spreads. We also control 
for credit market development, proxied by the ratio of private credit to GDP (PrvCredit) 
(Djankov, McLiesh, & Shleifer, 2007; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011). We anticipate lenders 
from more developed credit markets to offer a lower interest charge. All of the above country 
variables are measured at loan initiation (year t). For loans with multiple foreign lead arrangers 
domiciled in various countries, we use the average value among these countries. 
Finally, we control for loan purpose fixed effects based on seven categories of primary 
loan purposes, namely acquisition lines, LBO/MBO/SBO, takeover, debt repayment/ 
recapitalization, corporate purpose, working capital, and other purposes. We also control for 
year fixed effects and industry fixed effects using the 2-digit SIC code. A more detailed 
description of the definition and measurement of variables is presented in Table 1. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
3.3 Sample and Data 
Our sample selection starts with all dollar and non-dollar denominated loans issued to U.S. 
companies by foreign lead lenders3 recorded in the Thomson Reuters LPC DealScan Database 
between Jan 1996-Dec 2017. Our sample starts from 1996 because the data collection for the 
 
3 We require all the lead arrangers of our sample loans to be foreign banks since lenders with identical 
cultures can have different perceptions of risk and compensation when they lend to domestic, as 
opposed to foreign, firms. This issue could not be solved by controlling for the percentage of domestic 
lead arrangers in the lender group since the percentage of domestic lead arrangers can exert a non-linear 
effect on the whole lender group’s perception of risk and compensation. 
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DealScan Database commenced in 1996. The loan information for the previous years (1985-
1995) was recorded retroactively, so the data coverage for that period might be incomplete. 
The financial information of the borrower firm is obtained from Compustat. Loan variables are 
matched with firm variables using the link file provided by Chava and Roberts (2008) and 
updated in 2018. We further exclude loans issued to financial (SIC code 6000-6999) and 
regulated (SIC code 4400-4999) firms. Finally, we exclude loans with missing data on the 
variables used in the main regressions. The final sample consists of 1,221 loans issued to 475 
companies by foreign lenders from 24 countries. The number of observations in different tests 
might vary with the data availability of the variables used in the test. The sample selection 
procedure is described in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Table 3 presents the sample distribution by lender country (Panel A), borrower industry 
(Panel B), and loan issuance year (Panel C). In Panel A, the sum of the number of loans for all 
countries exceeds the total number of loans in our sample because a few loans involve multiple 
lead arrangers domiciled in different countries. The foreign lead arrangers in our sample come 
from a total of 24 countries. The countries contributing more than 100 loans are Canada, 
France, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Panel B shows the 
distribution of sample loans based on the industries of borrower firms. The industries 
represented most frequently are durable goods manufacturing, nondurable goods 
manufacturing, mining, and services. Panel C reports the yearly distribution of sample loans. 
The number of loans experienced a sharp decrease between 1999-2001 after the Asian financial 
crisis. It recovered from 2002 but decreased again in 2008 when the subprime mortgage crisis 
struck the U.S.  The number remained consistently low afterward, possibly due to the prolonged 
effects of the 2008 financial crisis and the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. This 
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pattern of distribution reveals that the supply of foreign credits is affected by the economic 
situations in both the foreign lender’s home country and the host country. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
4. Empirical Findings 
4.1 Summary Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
Table 4 reports the summary statistics of the variables used in our main tests. The mean 
(median) values of the foreign lender culture variables, i.e., Embeddedness and Master, are 
3.335 (3.355) and 3.803 (3.801), respectively. 
In Table 4, we also compare the firm and loan characteristics between our test sample 
and a comparison sample, which applies the same selection criteria as the test sample except 
that the lead arrangers are all domestic, instead of foreign, banks. The comparison reveals that 
the firms seeking funding from foreign creditors are with poorer performance. For example, 
the leverage ratio is significantly higher (mean = 0.289 in our test sample vs. mean = 0.244 in 
the comparison sample); the interest coverage ratio is significantly lower (mean = 17.226 in 
our test sample vs. mean = 23.362 in the comparison sample); the ROA is also significantly 
lower (mean = 0.020 in our test sample vs. mean = 0.036 in the comparison sample); and the 
ROA volatility is significantly higher (mean = 0.059 in our test sample vs. mean = 0.046 in the 
comparison sample). These findings are consistent with the conclusion in Haselmann and 
Wachtel (2011) that, despite the consensus in the literature based on less-developed economies 
that foreign creditors prefer choosing larger and better performing borrower firms compared 
with their domestic counterparts, the foreign creditors in developed markets, in contrast, tend 
to lend to riskier firms. 
The contract terms of our sample loans are generally less favorable than those of the 
compared loans, which might be due to: (1) the borrower firms being riskier in our test sample; 
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and (2) the foreign lenders using more restrictive terms to protect themselves against greater 
information asymmetry. For example, the interest spreads are significantly higher in our test 
sample (mean = 213.800) than in the comparison sample (mean = 187.750); the covenants are 
significantly more intensive (mean = 4.764 for Cov in our test sample vs. mean = 4.555 for Cov 
in the comparison sample); and the amount of the loan is significantly smaller (mean = 
$236.723 million in our test sample vs. mean = $298.274 million in the comparison sample). 
Notably, in our test sample with foreign lead arrangers, 42.5% of loans are led by relationship 
banks, while in the comparison sample with domestic lead arrangers, 49.4% of loans are led 
by relationship banks. This observation is consistent with the argument in the literature that 
foreign lenders are less likely to have prior lending relationships with local firms, exacerbating 
their information risk (Buch, 2003; Haselmann & Wachtel, 2011; Mian, 2003, 2006; Petersen 
& Rajan, 2002; Vu et al., 2015). 3.5% of loans in our test sample are non-dollar denominated, 
compared with 0.8% in the comparison sample. The average distance between lenders and 
borrowers is 8,979.382 km in our test sample, compared with 1,386.060 km in the comparison 
sample. 
Regarding the country variables in our test sample, the mean (median) of GDP per 
Capita for the foreign lead arrangers’ countries of domicile is $38,250.038 ($37,529.395). The 
mean (median) of GDP growth is 3.300% (3.000%); the mean (median) of inflation is 1.498% 
(1.358%); and the mean (median) of private credit to GDP is 111.264% (109.484%). 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
Table 5 provides the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in the main tests. The 
correlation coefficient between the two culture variables, i.e., Embeddedness and Mastery, is 
as high as 0.837 and statistically significant at the 1% level. Therefore, to avoid the 
multicollinearity problem, we do not include these two variables in the same regression in the 
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subsequent multivariate analyses. The correlations between Embeddedness and Log(IntSpread) 
and between Mastery and Log(IntSpread) are both negative and significant at the 1% level, 
providing preliminary support for hypotheses H1 and H2b. Regarding the control variables, 
Log(Firm Size), IntCov, Mar to Book, ROA, Z-Score, Log(Loan Size), Revolver, PPP, 
Log(Lender No.), NonDollar, and GDP Growth are significantly negatively associated with 
Log(IntSpread), and Leverage, σ(ROA), MarCon_US, Log(Maturity), InstLoan, Log(GeoDist), 
Log(GDP per Capita), and PrvCredit are significantly positively associated with 
Log(IntSpread). 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
4.2 The Impact of Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures on Interest Spreads 
Table 6 presents the estimation results of the impact of foreign lenders’ national cultures on 
interest rates. The first two columns do not include the control variables on lender country 
characteristics, whereas the last two include them. In Column 1, we document a significantly 
negative coefficient on Embeddedness (coef. = -0.310, t-stat. = -2.77), consistent with 
hypothesis H1. Column 2 shows a significantly negative coefficient on Mastery (coef. = -0.414, 
t-stat. = -2.53), lending support to hypothesis H2b. When we include the country-specific 
control variables in Columns 3 and 4, the significantly negative relations between 
Embeddedness and Log(IntSpread) and between Mastery and Log(IntSpread) continue to hold 
(coef. = -0.396, t-stat. = -3.46; coef. = -0.475, t-stat. = -2.95, respectively). 
With respect to the control variables, the results show that smaller firms with lower 
market to book ratios and ROA and higher leverage are subject to higher interest spreads. We 
document significantly positive coefficients on Log(Maturity) and significantly negative 
coefficients on Log(Loan Size). Institutional loans incur higher costs while revolving loans are 
less costly. The presence of PPP is significantly inversely associated with interest spreads. We 
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also find some evidence that non-dollar denominated loans have lower interest rates. Finally, 
the interest rate is higher if the foreign lenders’ home countries have higher inflations. The 
above findings are all consistent with our predictions, as discussed in Section 3.2. The 
coefficients on other control variables are insignificant in our regressions. 
Collectively, the findings in Table 6 indicate that foreign lenders domiciled in countries 
that prioritize harmonious group relationships, group interests, security, and public image tend 
to offer more favorable interest rates. The interest charge is also lower if the foreign lenders 
are domiciled in countries that promote active self-assertion to master, change, and exploit the 
natural and social environment. These effects are incremental to a wide range of borrower, 
loan, and lender country-specific variables that capture the default risk and information risk. 
Our findings provide evidence in support of the role of culture in cross-border lending. In 
particular, the foreign lenders’ values and beliefs stemming from their national cultures may 
play an indispensable role in setting the interest rate. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
4.3 Robustness Tests 
Exclude loans with multiple leads 
A syndicated loan can include multiple lead arrangers domiciled in different countries. There 
is a possibility that these lead arrangers have diametrically opposite culture scores, which in 
turn could affect our results. To address this issue, we exclude loans with multiple lead 
arrangers from our sample. Of 1,221 loans, 151 are removed in this robustness test. As reported 
in Table 7, Panel A, our previous finding that the foreign lenders from high embeddedness and 
mastery countries offer lower interest rates remains unchanged. 
 
Correct sample selection bias 
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In our main tests, we restrict our sample to loans arranged by foreign banks. However, the 
choice of having foreign, instead of domestic, lead arrangers is nonrandom. Some unobservable 
factors driving this choice can also affect the interest rate, exposing our main tests to an omitted 
correlated variable problem. We adopt the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure to mitigate 
this selection issue. In the first stage, we estimate a selection model that explains the choice of 
having foreign, instead of domestic, lead arrangers and calculate the inverse Mills ratio (IMR). 
The exclusion restriction we use is the median foreign lead percentage of all loans issued to 
U.S. borrowers in the same industry and year with the current loan, excluding the current loan 
from calculating the median. Foreign lead percentage is calculated as the number of foreign 
lead lenders divided by the total number of lead lenders. Because our regressions explicitly 
control for industry and year fixed effects, we do not expect the industry year median foreign 
lead percentage to directly affect the interest rate of the current loan (Hollander & Verriest, 
2016; Lee, Pappas, & Xu, 2020). 
In the second stage, we include IMR in Eq. (1) as an additional explanatory variable to 
correct for the potential sample selection bias. The results for the second-stage regression are 
presented in Table 7, Panel B. The coefficients on Embeddedness and Mastery continue to be 
negative and significant at the 1% level, confirming that our previous inferences are not 
affected by the sample selection issue. The coefficients on IMR are significantly negative in 
both columns, suggesting that sample selection bias exists in our main tests. 
 
2SLS Analysis 
There is a concern that our culture variables are correlated with some unobserved variables 
which are also correlated with the interest rate, leading to a spurious relation between the 
culture variables and the interest rate. To address this concern, we adopt an instrumental 
variable approach using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression analysis.  
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The instrument we use for Embeddedness is Murray and Schaller’s (2010) overall index 
of the historical prevalence of infectious diseases across geopolitical regions. Pathogen 
prevalence is a standard instrument for Hofstede’s individualism in culture-finance research 
(e.g., Boubakri & Saffar, 2016; Gaganis, Hasan, & Pasiouras, 2020; Zheng et al., 2013). Since 
embeddedness and individualism are closely related, we also use the pathogen prevalence as 
an instrument for Embeddedness. Fincher, Thornhill, Murray, and Schaller (2008) suggest that 
individuals of collectivist cultures are more wary of contact with outgroup members (strangers) 
and are less likely to eat unusual foods. Therefore, collectivism serves as a defense against the 
spread of disease and is more likely to emerge in societies that historically suffered a greater 
prevalence of pathogens. 
Following Gaganis et al. (2020), the instrument for Mastery we adopt is agricultural 
potential. Hansen, Jensen, and Skovsgaard (2015) suggest that societies with long histories of 
agriculture have higher mastery scores. Agricultural potential is measured by the maximum 
potential caloric yield attainable given the set of crops that were suitable for cultivation in the 
pre-1500 period. The data are from Galor and Özak (2016) and the raw figures are divided by 
1,000,000 to be expressed in millions. 
Prior studies (e.g., Chui et al., 2016; Licht et al., 2007; Shao, Kwok, & Zhang, 2013; 
Tang & Koveos, 2008) also use “pronoun drop”, which indicates whether the subject of a 
sentence can be dropped, to instrument for various cultural dimensions, because this 
grammatical feature of languages appears to be correlated with various cultural aspects 
(Kashima & Kashima, 1998). We also use pronoun drop as the second instrument for both 
Embeddedness and Mastery. 
At the same time, the historical prevalence of pathogens, agricultural potential, and 
grammatical features of languages of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile are unlikely to 
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have a direct impact on the interest rate they charge on a particular loan, satisfying the 
exogeneity requirement of instruments. 
The unreported results of the first stage regressions show that the coefficients on 
instruments are all statistically significant at the 1% level in both the Embeddedness and the 
Mastery models. The second stage regressions presented in Table 7, Panel C show that the 
fitted values of Embeddedness and Mastery both remain significantly negatively related to 
interest rate, alleviating the concern that endogeneity is behind our main findings. The Cragg-
Donald Wald F-statistic well exceeds the critical value reported by Stock and Yogo (2005) in 
each model, confirming that our instruments are relevant. The Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic, 
which is another test of relevance, also confirms that our instruments are relevant. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
Additional control variables 
To address the concern of omitted correlated variables, we also include additional control 
variables in the regression. First, we consider the effect of the legal environment of the foreign 
lead arrangers’ countries of domicile, proxied by the creditor rights and legal enforcement (La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). The legal environment of a country is 
correlated with the national culture of the country (Licht et al., 2007). Although the legal 
environment in the lender country is unlikely to affect loan pricing directly since creditor rights 
are normally determined by the laws in the borrower country, and the enforcement of contracts 
relies on the courts of the borrower country, the judicial risk of the lender country can influence 
the foreign lenders’ design of loan contracts by building their risk attitudes. We repeat the main 
tests with Creditor Rights and Legal Enforcement as additional control variables and report the 
results in Table 8, Columns (1) and (2). The coefficients on Embeddedness and Mastery are 
both significantly negative, similar to those in the main tests, suggesting that the effect of 
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informal institutions on interest rates is incremental to that of formal institutions. Moreover, 
we do not document a significant impact of Creditor Rights and Legal Enforcement on interest 
rate. 
Second, we add a set of control variables that capture the economic and political 
conditions of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile, namely trade openness (Trade 
Openness), control of corruption (CtrofCorr), market capitalization (MCAP), and whether the 
country is undergoing a systematically important banking crisis (SysBankCrises). Table 8, 
Columns (3) and (4) show that the coefficients on Embeddedness and Mastery remain 
significantly negative after including additional foreign lender country controls. The results on 
these additional foreign lender country controls reveal that foreign lenders from countries with 
lower corruptions and countries undergoing systematically important banking crises charge 
higher interest spreads. Trade openness and market capitalization do not exhibit any significant 
impact on interest spreads. 
Finally, we add some lender-specific controls, namely Lender Size, Lender ROA, and 
Lender Leverage. Data on lender controls are collected from Compustat Bank and Compustat 
Global. We identify the Compustat GVKEYs for the foreign banks in our sample based on the 
DealScan lenders-Compustat link table in Schwert (2018). For lenders not included in the link 
table, we manually match them to Compustat following the procedure described in Schwert 
(2018). We take mergers and acquisitions into account based on information from SNL 
Financial, and acquired firms are aggregated to their acquirers at the effective date of the 
merger. In Table 8, Columns (5) and (6), the coefficient on Embeddedness is still negative and 
significant at the 1% level. Notably, the magnitude of this coefficient becomes twice as large 
as that in the main test (-0.749 vs. -0.396). The coefficient on Mastery is negative and 
marginally significant. Regarding the additional lender controls, we find that larger banks offer 
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lower interest rates. The coefficients on Lender ROA and Lender Leverage are either 
insignificant or inconsistent in different regressions. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
Alternative culture measures 
We also test the sensitivity of our results to alternative culture measures. Specifically, we 
replace Schwartz’s (1994) cultural dimensions with alternative measures that capture 
conceptually similar cultural aspects. First, we use Hofstede’s (1980) cultural values 
Individualism and Masculinity to replace Embeddedness and Mastery respectively. Hofstede’s 
(1980) cultural values are empirically validated and widely acknowledged in Socio-financial 
research. 4  Hofstede’s Individualism and Schwartz’s Embeddedness both deal with the 
relationship between the individual and the group. Individualism is negatively related to 
Embeddedness (Schwartz, 2004). There is also some degree of conceptual convergence 
between Hofstede’s Masculinity and Schwartz’s Mastery, since both of them refer to the 
tendency to assertively try to control the social and natural world (Schwartz, 2004). Table 9, 
Panel A shows that foreign lenders from higher individualism cultures charge higher interest 
rates, whereas masculinity doesn’t show any significant impact on interest rate. 
The second set of alternative culture measures are drawn from the Inglehart’s World 
Values Survey (WVS) (Inglehart, 1997; Inglehart, Basanez, & Moreno, 1998; Inglehart & 
Welzel, 2005). Inglehart classifies culture into two dimensions, survival versus self-expression 
values (Survival) and traditional versus secular–rational values (Traditional). Although 
Inglehart focuses on the social and political aspect while Schwartz focuses on the psychological 
aspect of culture, Inglehart’s cultural dimensions can be seen as two expressions of the more 
 




fundamental and abstract Schwartz’s Embeddedness (Dobewall & Rudnev, 2014). Specifically, 
high Survival culture stress material values above other goals such as economic and physical 
security, trust, and responsibility; and high Traditional culture attaches great importance to 
traditional authority (especially religious authority), family and communal obligations, and 
norms of sharing. Therefore, Survival should be negatively related to Embeddedness; and 
Traditional should be positively related to Embeddedness. Schwartz’s Mastery is not captured 
by Survival or Traditional. Table 9, Panel B reports that foreign lenders from higher Survival 
cultures charge higher interest rates, whereas Traditional doesn’t reveal any significant impact 
on interest rate. 
Finally, we use the Global Leadership and Organizational Behavior Effectiveness 
(GLOBE) cultural dimensions to replace Embeddedness and Mastery. The GLOBE project is 
a large-scale study of organizational leadership in a cultural context (House, Hanges, Javidan, 
Dorfman, & Gupta, 2004). Among the nine cultural dimensions developed by GLOBE, In-
group Collectivism, which evaluates the extent to which members of a society express pride, 
loyalty, and cohesiveness in their groups, organizations, or families, conceptually coincides 
with Schwartz’s Embeddedness; and Assertiveness, which measures the degree to which 
individuals in societies are assertive, confrontational, aggressive, and straightforward, is 
consistent with Schwartz’s Mastery. In Table 9, Panel C, we replace Embeddedness with In-
group Collectivism and replace Mastery with Assertiveness, respectively. We re-estimate 
Equation (1) and find significantly negative coefficients on both In-group Collectivism and 
Assertiveness. 
In general, the results in Table 9 suggest that our main findings are insensitive to 
alternative culture measures. Using alternative measures for the extent to which individuals in 
a certain society (1) are embedded in groups and (2) actively seek to master and change the 
world, we still find some impact of these two cultural dimensions on interest spreads. All three 
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alternative measures for embeddedness confirm a negative effect of embeddedness on interest 
spreads while one out the three alternative measures for mastery supports a negative relation 
between mastery and interest rate. 
[Insert Table 9] 
 
4.4 Conditional Tests 
Information asymmetry 
We perform a conditional test based on the information asymmetry between the foreign lenders 
and the borrower. If the foreign lenders possess sufficient information about the borrower, they 
are more likely to form objective judgments based on the information they acquire and less 
likely to be affected by subjective perceptions. Therefore, we expect the impact of foreign 
lenders’ national cultures on interest rate to be less pronounced when the information 
asymmetry between the foreign lenders and the borrower is lower. 
To test this prediction, we partition the sample based on information asymmetry, 
estimate Equation (1) separately using each subsample, and compare the results of the culture 
variables across the different subsamples using an F-test. We adopt three proxies to capture the 
information asymmetry: the presence of prior lending relationships between the foreign lenders 
and the borrower in the previous five-year period (PreRelation), the borrower’s information 
environment measured by the analysts’ forecast dispersion on the borrower (Forecast 
Dispersion), and the geographical distance between the foreign lenders and the borrower 
(GeoDist). Lenders with prior lending relationships with the borrower firm (PreRelation = 1) 
should possess more information about the firm than new lenders (Bharath et al., 2007). A 
borrower with lower analysts’ forecast dispersion (Forecast Dispersion < sample median 
Forecast Dispersion) should be more transparent (Abarbanell, Lanen, & Verrecchia, 1995; 
Barron, Kim, Lim, & Stevens, 1998). Geographically proximate lenders (GeoDist < sample 
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median GeoDist) are more capable of collecting information on the borrower than remote 
lenders (Giannetti & Laeven, 2012; Hollander & Verriest, 2016; Petersen & Rajan, 2002). 
Table 10 provides the conditional test results. We find that the negative impacts of 
Embeddedness and Mastery on interest rate are attenuated in the PreRelation = 1, low Forecast 
Dispersion, and low GeoDist subsamples. The p-values of the F-tests indicate that the 
differences in coefficients on Embeddedness and Mastery between the low vs. high subsamples 
are all statistically significant with each of the three conditional variables. These findings 
support the prediction that the impact of culture variables on interest rate is weakened when 
the information asymmetry between the foreign lenders and the borrower is lower. 
[Insert Table 10] 
 
Foreign lender bargaining power 
Loan contracts are negotiated between lenders and borrowers and the resulting contract terms 
should reflect the relative bargaining power of each party (LSTA, 2007; Sufi, 2007). When the 
lenders possess more initiative in the negotiation, their values and beliefs stemming from 
national cultures should be more capable of influencing the negotiation outcomes. Therefore, 
we expect the impact of foreign lenders’ national cultures on interest rate to be more noticeable 
when the lenders possess greater bargaining power. 
To test this prediction, we partition the sample based on foreign lender bargaining 
power, estimate Equation (1) separately using each subsample, and compare the results of the 
culture variables across the different subsamples using an F-test. We proxy for the foreign 
lenders’ bargaining power using three variables: the borrower’s financial constraints measured 
with the Whited and Wu (2006) index (Fin Constraints), the U.S. Lerner index, which is a 
reverse measure of banking competition in the U.S. (Lerner_US), and the market condition in 
the U.S. (MarCon_US). The foreign lenders should acquire greater bargaining power when the 
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borrower is under more financial constraints (Fin Constraints > sample median Fin 
Constraints) (Campello, Graham, & Harvey, 2010), when the banking market is less 
competitive in the host country (Lerner_US > sample median Lerner_US) (Hainz, Weill, & 
Godlewski, 2013; Lian, 2018), and when the host country is experiencing an economic 
downturn (MarCon_US > sample median MarCon_US) (Giannetti & Laeven, 2012; Houston, 
Itzkowitz, & Naranjo, 2017). 
Table 11 provides the conditional test results. We find that the negative impacts of 
Embeddedness and Mastery on interest rate are strengthened in the high Fin Constraints, high 
Lerner_US, and high MarCon_US subsamples. The differences in coefficients on 
Embeddedness and Mastery between the low vs. high subsamples are mostly statistically 
significant with all three conditional variables based on the p-values of the F-tests.5 These 
findings are consistent with the prediction that the impact of culture variables on interest rate 
is more pronounced when the foreign lenders possess greater bargaining power. 
[Insert Table 11] 
 
4.5 The Impact of Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures on Covenant Intensity 
In this additional test, we examine the impact of foreign lenders’ national cultures on covenant 
intensity. We apply three measures to capture the covenant intensity: (1) the total number of 
covenants included in a loan contract (Cov); (2) a covenant index based on Bradley and Roberts 
(2015), which considers the presence of both financial and certain general covenants -- 
specifically, the index assigns one point (maximum of six) if any of the following covenants 
exists in a loan: security provision, dividend restriction, more than two restrictions on financial 
 
5 The only exception is with the difference in coefficients on Mastery between the low Lerner_US and 
high Lerner_US subsamples. The magnitude of coefficient and the absolute value of t-statistic are 
higher in the high Lerner_US subsample (coef. = -1.132, t-stat. = -4.74) than in the low Lerner_US 
subsample (coef. = -0.654, t-stat. = -2.21), but the F-test suggests that the difference is insignificant (p-
value = 0.243). 
31 
 
ratios, asset sweep, debt sweep, and equity sweep (Cov_BR); and (3) another covenant index 
based on Fields, Fraser, and Subrahmanyam (2012), which is similar to the Bradley and Roberts 
(2015) index. Specifically, the index assigns one point (maximum of three) if any of the 
following covenant categories exists in a loan: security provisions, more than two restrictions 
on financial ratios, and whether the loan covenants include asset, debt, and/or equity sweeps 
(Cov_FFS). We regress each covenant intensity measure on the same set of explanatory 
variables as in Eq. (1). Since the covenant intensity variables are all count variables, we adopt 
Poisson regressions. 
The results are presented in Table 12. In Columns 1 and 2, the dependent variable is 
Cov. The coefficient on Embeddedness is negative and significant at the 5% level. The 
coefficient on Mastery is also negative and marginally significant. The results in Columns 3 
and 4, where the dependent variable is Cov_BR, and in Columns 5 and 6, where the dependent 
variable is Cov_FFS, are similar to those in the first two columns. These findings provide some 
evidence that foreign lenders from countries with higher embeddedness and mastery scores 
impose less intensive covenants. 
With respect to the control variables, the results show that smaller firms with higher 
leverage ratios are subject to more restrictive covenants. We find significantly negative 
coefficients on Mar to Book when the dependent variable is Cov_BR/Cov_FFS, consistent with 
the finding in prior studies that firms with more growth potentials are less willing to be 
constrained by debt covenants (Kahan & Yermack, 1998; Reisel, 2014). Institutional loans 
have tighter covenants. The presence of PPP is also positively associated with the intensity of 
covenants, consistent with the notion that PPPs complement, rather than substitute, covenants 
(Chan et al., 2013; Costello & Wittenberg-Moerman, 2011; Graham et al., 2008; Kim, Song, 
& Zhang, 2011). We expect the number of lenders in a loan to be negatively associated with 
the covenant intensity since the cost of renegotiation increases in the number of lenders 
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involved as a result of the coordination problems (Bolton & Scharfstein, 1996; Gilson, John, 
& Lang, 1990). However, we document an opposite result. The positive coefficients on 
Log(Lender No.) might be caused by a confounding effect that better quality loans being able 
to attract more lenders to join the syndicate. In addition, lenders located further from the 
borrower rely more on restrictive covenants to monitor the borrower. Finally, we document 
some weak evidence that lenders domiciled in countries with higher GDP growth, private credit 
to GDP, and inflation impose more restrictive covenants. 
[Insert Table 12] 
 
5. Conclusion 
This study examines the link between the national cultures of foreign banks’ countries of 
domicile and the pricing of syndicated loans. Using Schwartz’s (1994) cultural dimensions to 
proxy for national culture, we find that a high embeddedness value, which emphasizes 
harmonious group relationships, group interests, security, and public image, decreases foreign 
lenders’ demands on interest rates. Moreover, foreign lenders rooted in high mastery cultures, 
which stress individual success, capability, and taking control, also charge lower interest 
spreads. These results are robust to a battery of robustness tests and incremental to the effects 
of the formal institutions of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile. We also document that 
greater information asymmetry and foreign lenders’ bargaining powers strengthen the impact 
of foreign lenders’ national cultures on interest rates. Finally, in an additional analysis, we 
provide evidence that the intensity of loan covenants is also negatively related to the 
embeddedness and mastery scores of the foreign lenders’ countries of domicile. 
These findings provide new insight into the culture-debt contracting literature. Prior 
studies (Chui et al., 2016; He & Hu, 2016; Jiang et al., 2018) document that the borrowers’ 
cultures affect their creditworthiness and agency issues, and therefore exert an impact on their 
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cost of borrowing. Different from these studies, we focus on the lenders’ cultures. After holding 
the borrowers’ national cultures constant, we find a relation between the lenders’ national 
cultures and interest rates in a cross-border lending setting. This relation is possibly attributable 
to the lenders’ subjective assertions of values and beliefs shaped by their national cultures. 
Our study also offers some practical implications for market participants. First, firms 
seeking funds from foreign lenders domiciled in countries with low embeddedness or mastery 
scores are more likely to be charged higher interest rates. Firms should be aware of this cultural 
impact when choosing creditors. If they must approach banks from a less group-oriented or 
self-assertion culture, they should exert efforts to mitigate the culture’s adverse effects, e.g., by 
improving the information quality. Second, firms should match their economic conditions with 
the banks’ cultural backgrounds when choosing creditors. For example, firms with high growth 
potential might want to maintain their flexibility in making investment decisions and avoid 
excessive creditor interventions. These firms are reluctant to form intensive covenants, which 
can lead to covenant violations and transfers of control rights to creditors. Banks from high 
embeddedness and high mastery countries would, therefore, suit these firms better since they 
are less likely to impose intensive covenants. Overall, this study underscores the indispensable 
role of lenders’ cultural backgrounds in cross-border lending and points out some interesting 
future research avenues, such as how other behavioral aspects of lender characteristics would 
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Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
Foreign Lender Culture Variables (Source: specified in below) 
Assertiveness Cultural score on assertiveness from GLOBE. 
Source: House et al. (2004) 
Embeddedness Schwartz’s cultural score on embeddedness. 
Source: Licht et al. (2007) 
Individualism Hofstede’s cultural score on individualism. 
Source: Hofstede (2001) 
In-group 
Collectivism 
Cultural score on in-group collectivism from GLOBE. 
Source: House et al. (2004) 
Masculinity Hofstede’s cultural score on masculinity. 
Source: Hofstede (2001) 
Mastery Schwartz’s cultural score on mastery. 
Source: Licht et al. (2007) 
Survival Cultural score on survival versus self-expression values from WVS. 
Source: WVS 
Traditional Cultural score on traditional versus secular–rational values from WVS. 
Source: WVS 
Borrower Variables (Source: Compustat unless specified) 
σ(ROA) Standard deviation of ROA (defined below) estimated over the previous three to five years as 
available. 
Lerner_US Banking competition in the U.S. measured by the Lerner index. The Lerner index is measured 
by the difference between the output price and the marginal cost divided by the output price. 
Higher values of the Lerner index indicate less banking competition. 
Source: Global Development Finance Database 
CurRatio Current ratio, calculated as the ratio of current assets (ACT) to current liabilities (LCT). 
Fin Constraints (Whited & Wu, 2006)Whited and Wu (2006) financial constraints index computed as (-0.091 
CF - 0.062 DIVPOS + 0.021 Leverage - 0.044 Log(Firm Size) + 0.102 ISG - 0.035 SG), where 
CF is the ratio of cash flow to total assets (CHE / AT); DIVPOS is an indicator that takes the 
value of one if the firm pays cash dividends (DV) and zero otherwise; Leverage and Firm Size 
are defined as in below; ISG is the firm’s three-digit industry sales growth; and SG is firm 
sales growth ((Salet/Salet-1)-1). 
Firm Size The firm’s total assets (AT) in millions of dollars. 
Forecast 
Dispersion 
Analyst forecast dispersion measured as the standard deviation of all analyst forecasts in the 
month prior to the loan issuance date divided by the stock price at the loan issuance date. 
Source: I/B/E/S 
IMR Inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first stage of Heckman (1979) selection model.  
IntCov Interest coverage rate, measured by the ratio of operating income (OIBDP) to interest expense 
(XINT). 
Leverage Ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to total assets (AT). 
Mar to book Ratio of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt (PRCC × CSHO + LT) to total 
assets (AT). 
MarCon_US Market condition of the borrower country measured with a principal component analysis 
combined metric based on three different macroeconomic factors: (1) the difference between 
the yields on Moody’s BAA- and AAA-rated corporate bonds; (2) the difference between the 
yields on ten-year government securities and three-month Treasury Bill; and (3) yields on the 
three-month Treasury Bill. A higher value indicates a worse market condition. 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 





Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
Tangibility Ratio of net PPE plus inventory (PPENT + INVT) to total assets (AT). 
Z-Score Altman (1968) Z-score for the likelihood of bankruptcy, computed as (1.2 Working capital + 
1.4 Retained earnings + 3.3 EBIT + 0.999 Sales) / Total assets + 0.6 (Market value of equity 
/ Book value of total liabilities) = (1.2 WCAP + 1.4 RE + 3.3 (PI + XINT - IINT) + 0.999 
SALE) / AT + 0.6 (PRCC × CSHO) / LT. 
Loan Variables (Source: DealScan) 
Cov The total number of covenants included in a loan contract. 
Cov_BR An index that assigns one point (maximum of six) if any of the following covenants exists in 
a loan: security provision, dividend restriction, more than two restrictions on financial ratios, 
asset sweep, debt sweep, and equity sweep (Bradley & Roberts, 2015). 
Cov_FFS An index that assigns one point (maximum of three) if any of the following covenant 
categories exists in a loan: security provision, more than two restrictions on financial ratios, 
and whether the loan covenants include asset, debt, and/or equity sweeps (Fields et al., 2012). 
GeoDist The shortest distance between the borrower’s headquarter and the foreign lead arranger’s 
headquarter in kilometres according to the Vincenty (sphere) method. For loan i, we take the 
average distance between all foreign lead lenders and the borrower. 
InstLoan An indicator variable equal to one for loans with a type of term loan B, C, D, E, F, G or H 
(institutional term loans) and zero otherwise. 
IntSpread Interest spread, measured by All in Spread Drawn (AISD), which is the annual spread paid 
over LIBOR for each dollar drawn down from the loan. The commitment fee, annual fee, 
upfront fee, etc., are all included in the calculation of AISD. 
LeadRep An indicator variable equal to one if deal i is syndicated by one of the top 25 lead arrangers 
in the U.S. syndicated loan market and zero otherwise. The ranking of lead arrangers is based 
on their previous year market shares, in terms of the total amount of deals that they syndicated. 
In calculating the market share, the deal amount is split equally among all of the lead arrangers 
if a deal involves multiple leads. For deal i, LeadRep is determined based on the highest 
ranking of all of its lead arrangers (Ball, Bushman, & Vasvari, 2008). 
Lender No. The number of lenders in the loan syndicate, including both lead arrangers and participant 
lenders. 
Loan Purpose Loans are divided into seven groups according to their primary purpose: acquisition lines, 
LBO/MBO/SBO, takeover, debt repay/recapitalization, corporate purpose, working capital, 
and other purposes. 
Loan Size The loan amount in millions of dollars. 
Maturity Loan maturity in months. 
PPP An indicator variable equal to one if the loan agreement contains performance pricing 
provisions and zero otherwise. 
PreRelation An indicator variable equal to one if at least one of the lead arrangers of deal i has led the 
borrower firm’s prior deals within the previous five-year period and zero otherwise (Ivashina, 
2009). 
Revolver An indicator variable equal to one for revolving loans and zero otherwise. A revolving loan is 
a loan with a type of any of the following: "Revolver/Line < 1 Yr.", "Revolver/ Line >= 1 
Yr.", "Revolver/Term Loan", "364-Day Facility", "Demand Loan", or "Limited Line”. 
Foreign Lender Country Variables (Source: specified in below) 
Creditor Rights Creditor rights measured with the index developed by La Porta et al. (1998) and updated by 
Djankov et al. (2007). This index considers four types of rights that creditors possess in the 
event of default: (1) there are restrictions, such as creditor consent or minimum dividends, for 
a debtor to file for reorganization; (2) secured creditors are able to seize their collateral once 
a reorganization petition is approved; (3) secured creditors are paid first out of the proceeds 
of liquidating a bankrupt firm; and (4) the administration of the property pending the 




Definition and Measurement of Variables 
Variables  Definition and Measurement 
by the debtor. One point is added to a country if its laws and regulations grant any of the above 
rights to creditors. The index records the aggregated points for each country, ranging from 
zero to four with higher values representing stronger creditor rights. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998), Djankov et al. (2007) 
CtrofCorr Control of corruption measured with an index that captures perceptions of the extent to which 
public power is exercised for private gain. A higher value implies less corruption.  
Source: World Governance Indicators 
GDP Growth Annual percentage growth rate of GDP based on current U.S. dollars. 
Source: World Bank 
GDP per Capita Gross domestic product in current U.S. dollars divided by the midyear population. 
Source: World Bank 
Inflation Annual percentage change in the consumer price index. 
Source: World Bank 
Legal 
Enforcement 
Legal enforcement measured using the Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard (2003) legality index, 
which aggregates five individual legality proxies from La Porta et al. (1998), namely the 
effectiveness of the judiciary, rule of law, risk of contract repudiation, absence of corruption, 
and risk of expropriation, into a parsimonious measure using the principal component 
analysis. 
Source: La Porta et al. (1998), Berkowitz et al. (2003) 
MCAP Market capitalization of listed domestic companies divided by GDP. 
Source: World Development Indicators 
PrvCredit Ratio of private credit to GDP. Private credit is credit from deposit-taking financial institutions 
to the private sector. 
Source: IMF 
SysBankCrises An indicator variable equal to one if the foreign lead arrangers’ countries of domicile had a 
systemically important banking crisis for the year t and zero otherwise. 
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2010), Giannetti and Laeven (2012) 
Trade Openness Ratio of trade (exports plus imports) to GDP. 
Source: Penn World Tables 
Lender Variables (Source: Compustat Bank, Compustat Global) 
Lender Leverage The average ratio of long-term debt (DLTT) to total assets (AT) for all foreign lead arrangers 
in a loan. 
Lender ROA The average return on assets for all foreign lead arrangers in a loan, calculated as the net 
income before extraordinary items (IB) divided by average assets (AT). 




Sample Selection Procedure 
Selection Procedure No. of Loans 
Dollar denominated and non-dollar denominated loans issued to U.S. companies by foreign 
lead lenders in the DealScan database between Jan 1996-Dec 2017 
    12,781 
- Loans cannot be matched with financial data in Compustat     (8,669) 
- Loans issued to financial or regulated firms     (1,360) 
- Loans missing data on culture variables          (22) 
- Loans missing data on other test and control variables      (1509) 
Test Sample       1,221 
 







 No. of Loans 






United Kingdom 140 
Japan 47 
Norway 13 

















Panel B: Sample Distribution by Industry 
SIC01-09 Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 24 
SIC10-14 Mining 180 
SIC15-17 Construction 16 
SIC20-33 Nondurable goods manufacturing 297 
SIC34-39 Durable goods manufacturing 305 
SIC40-42 Transportation 22 
SIC50-51 Wholesale trade 76 
SIC52-59 Retail trade 64 
SIC70-89 Services 237 
  















Test Sample (Foreign Lender Loans) 
N = 1,221 
 
Comparing Sample (Domestic Lender 
Loans) 
N = 19,317 
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev.  Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Foreign Lender Culture Variables 
Embeddedness 3.335 3.355 0.201     
Mastery 3.803 3.801 0.132     
Borrower Variables 
Firm Size ($m) 3,879.629 1,038.946 9,363.603  3,508.854 845.781*** 7,685.668 
Leverage 0.289 0.264 0.210  0.244*** 0.221*** 0.192 
IntCov 17.226 5.340 43.283  23.362*** 6.941*** 61.808 
CurRatio 1.842 1.517 1.232  1.931** 1.689*** 1.096 
Mar to Book 1.730 1.413 0.991  1.708 1.444 0.911 
Tangibility 0.466 0.459 0.242  0.457 0.450 0.229 
ROA 0.020 0.035 0.110  0.036*** 0.046*** 0.088 
σ (ROA) 0.059 0.032 0.080  0.046*** 0.024*** 0.061 
Z-Score 3.395 2.790 3.099  3.776*** 3.307*** 2.511 
MarCon_US -0.216 -0.668 1.377  -0.167 -0.414 1.343 
Loan Variables 
IntSpread (bps) 231.800 200.000 161.681  187.750*** 175.000*** 126.038 
Cov 4.764 4.000 3.911  4.555*** 4.000** 3.433 
Cov_BR 2.283 1.000 2.174  2.002*** 1.000*** 1.982 
Cov_FFS 1.303 1.000 1.131  1.130*** 1.000*** 1.083 
Maturity (month) 50.564 60.000 22.585  46.916*** 58.000*** 21.461 
Loan Size ($m) 236.723 125.000 340.549  298.274*** 125.000 460.947 
InstLoan 0.197 0 0.398  0.076*** 0*** 0.265 
Revolver 0.535 1 0.499  0.721*** 1*** 0.448 
PPP 0.393 0 0.489  0.469*** 0*** 0.499 
LeadRep 0.459 1 0.438  0.682*** 1*** 0.466 
PreRelation 0.425 0 0.495  0.494*** 0*** 0.500 
Lender No. 6.164 4.000 6.207  7.426*** 5.000*** 7.187 
NonDollar 0.035 0 0.184  0.008*** 0*** 0.087 
GeoDist (km) 8,979.382 9,023.852 1,290.359  1,386.060*** 1,270.800*** 1,004.287 
Foreign Lender Country Variables 
GDP per Capita ($) 38,250.038 37,529.395 6,658.253     
GDP Growth (%) 3.300 3.000 2.800     
PrvCredit (%) 111.264 109.484 28.897     
Inflation (%) 1.498 1.358 1.256     
 
Notes: This table presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the main tests. It also reports the tests of differences 
in means and medians between the loans led by foreign versus domestic lenders. We use ***, **, and * to denote that the 
means (t-test) and the medians (Wilcoxon rank sum test) for the compared samples are significantly different at the 1 percent, 
5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. The extreme values of all of the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 




Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1 Embeddedness                
2 Mastery 0.837               
3 Log(IntSpread) -0.203 -0.135              
4 Cov -0.037 -0.013 0.223             
5 Cov_BR -0.080 -0.038 0.318 0.959            
6 Cov_FFS  -0.080 -0.043 0.383 0.892 0.952           
7 Log(Firm Size) -0.040 -0.009 -0.275 -0.359 -0.381 -0.395          
8 Leverage -0.060 -0.011 0.193 0.097 0.138 0.166 0.039         
9 IntCov 0.068 0.047 -0.076 -0.027 -0.025 -0.032 -0.070 -0.348        
10 CurRatio 0.040 0.039 -0.023 0.017 0.001 -0.008 -0.137 -0.206 0.324       
11 Mar to Book 0.006 -0.019 -0.143 -0.081 -0.094 -0.110 -0.068 -0.151 0.267 0.131      
12 Tangibility 0.143 0.066 0.003 0.113 0.107 0.111 -0.105 0.228 -0.195 -0.265 -0.212     
13 ROA -0.028 -0.001 -0.140 -0.045 -0.076 -0.088 0.145 -0.224 0.325 0.132 0.149 -0.114    
14 σ(ROA) -0.047 -0.048 0.108 0.081 0.102 0.105 -0.244 0.023 -0.052 0.055 0.145 0.053 -0.397   
15 Z-Score 0.057 0.012 -0.204 -0.085 -0.124 -0.152 -0.017 -0.508 0.491 0.446 0.607 -0.247 0.448 -0.093  
16 MarCon_US -0.059 -0.008 0.344 -0.032 -0.016 0.011 0.147 0.061 -0.039 0.003 -0.177 0.013 -0.048 -0.030 -0.127 
17 Log(Maturity) -0.132 -0.078 0.250 0.124 0.160 0.197 -0.102 0.096 -0.011 -0.006 -0.057 -0.023 0.035 -0.057 -0.065 
18 Log(Loan Size) -0.068 -0.017 -0.206 -0.021 -0.056 -0.086 0.480 0.116 -0.006 -0.057 -0.078 0.064 0.105 -0.114 -0.020 
19 InstLoan -0.199 -0.083 0.344 0.064 0.149 0.205 0.059 0.192 -0.025 0.001 -0.070 -0.091 0.004 0.012 -0.101 
20 Revolver 0.105 0.025 -0.279 0.008 -0.054 -0.086 -0.072 -0.090 -0.022 -0.030 -0.026 0.097 -0.003 0.008 0.014 
21 PPP 0.109 0.065 -0.132 0.470 0.407 0.378 -0.108 -0.003 0.016 -0.020 -0.052 0.112 0.057 -0.030 0.007 
22 LeadRep -0.111 -0.009 0.005 -0.049 -0.046 -0.031 0.224 0.107 0.023 0.019 0.031 -0.063 0.036 -0.024 -0.029 
23 PreRelation -0.055 -0.060 -0.043 0.029 0.022 0.029 0.136 0.116 -0.055 -0.051 -0.032 0.091 0.029 -0.028 -0.048 
24 Log(Lender No.) 0.045 -0.003 -0.183 0.252 0.174 0.123 0.156 -0.018 -0.020 -0.106 -0.073 0.119 0.069 -0.068 0.035 
25 NonDollar 0.089 0.084 -0.076 -0.017 -0.022 -0.021 0.080 -0.037 -0.007 0.000 0.003 -0.016 0.030 -0.045 0.029 
26 Log(GeoDist) -0.430 -0.331 0.080 0.060 0.087 0.080 -0.030 0.013 0.010 -0.019 0.014 0.102 0.001 0.115 0.022 
27 Log(GDP per Capita) -0.138 0.133 0.300 -0.010 0.024 0.040 0.164 0.085 0.072 0.078 0.017 -0.156 0.094 -0.022 0.008 
28 GDP Growth  -0.025 -0.012 -0.166 0.017 0.016 0.006 -0.033 -0.018 0.065 0.012 0.111 -0.008 0.027 0.042 0.073 
29 PrvCredit  -0.043 0.199 0.156 -0.026 -0.001 0.004 0.053 -0.008 0.104 0.119 0.013 -0.184 0.083 -0.019 0.051 







Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
16 MarCon_US               
17 Log(Maturity) -0.070              
18 Log(Loan Size) 0.176 -0.010             
19 InstLoan 0.094 0.306 0.147            
20 Revolver -0.043 -0.250 -0.001 -0.517           
21 PPP -0.032 0.017 0.133 -0.207 0.230          
22 LeadRep 0.123 0.006 0.300 0.136 -0.038 0.019         
23 PreRelation 0.111 -0.025 0.250 0.043 0.074 0.078 0.215        
24 Log(Lender No.) 0.051 -0.001 0.403 -0.173 0.195 0.325 0.095 0.153       
25 NonDollar 0.075 -0.080 -0.005 -0.018 -0.030 0.052 -0.003 -0.017 -0.028      
26 Log(GeoDist) -0.021 0.013 -0.023 0.048 -0.043 -0.068 -0.015 0.053 -0.041 -0.076     
27 Log(GDP per Capita) 0.332 0.066 0.273 0.277 -0.137 -0.049 0.283 0.071 -0.070 0.014 0.032    
28 GDP Growth  -0.532 0.026 0.007 -0.006 0.017 -0.015 0.045 -0.068 -0.059 -0.072 0.062 -0.019   
29 PrvCredit  0.226 0.025 0.083 0.160 -0.114 -0.091 0.103 -0.035 -0.122 0.060 0.001 0.554 -0.087  
30 Inflation -0.069 -0.115 0.005 -0.118 0.039 0.078 -0.014 -0.010 0.094 -0.045 -0.131 -0.105 0.305 -0.242 
 
Notes: This table presents the Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables used in the main tests. Refer to Table 1 for the definition and measurement of variables. Figures in bold 




Impact of Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures on Interest Spreads 
 Dependent Variable: Log(IntSpread) 
 Pred. Sign  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Foreign Lender Culture Variables 
Embeddedness - -0.310***  -0.396***  
  (-2.77)  (-3.46)  
Mastery ?  -0.414**  -0.475*** 
   (-2.53)  (-2.95) 
Borrower Variables 
Log(Firm Size) - -0.159*** -0.160*** -0.156*** -0.157*** 
  (-6.53) (-6.67) (-6.59) (-6.65) 
Leverage + 0.482*** 0.494*** 0.484*** 0.488*** 
  (3.64) (3.74) (3.77) (3.78) 
IntCov - -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.43) (-0.50) (-0.41) (-0.51) 
CurRatio - -0.012 -0.013 -0.014 -0.015 
  (-0.53) (-0.62) (-0.63) (-0.70) 
Mar to Book - -0.077*** -0.078*** -0.075*** -0.076*** 
  (-2.92) (-2.85) (-2.79) (-2.70) 
Tangibility - -0.104 -0.129 -0.113 -0.127 
  (-0.82) (-0.99) (-0.84) (-0.93) 
ROA - -0.394** -0.364** -0.365* -0.340* 
  (-2.32) (-2.14) (-1.96) (-1.84) 
σ(ROA) + 0.268 0.296 0.263 0.295 
  (0.84) (0.92) (0.86) (0.94) 
Z-Score - 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.008 
  (0.91) (0.90) (0.86) (0.79) 
MarCon_US + 0.066 0.072 0.066 0.073 
  (0.92) (1.02) (0.91) (1.04) 
Loan Variables 
Log(Maturity) + 0.114*** 0.116*** 0.114** 0.117*** 
  (2.62) (2.67) (2.54) (2.64) 
Log(Loan Size) - -0.131*** -0.129*** -0.133*** -0.131*** 
  (-8.98) (-9.00) (-9.56) (-9.35) 
InstLoan + 0.263*** 0.270*** 0.262*** 0.266*** 
  (4.29) (4.45) (4.16) (4.17) 
Revolver - -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.175*** -0.175*** 
  (-4.96) (-5.01) (-4.97) (-4.95) 
PPP - -0.135*** -0.138*** -0.138*** -0.140*** 
  (-2.95) (-3.00) (-3.11) (-3.17) 
LeadRep - -0.012 -0.002 -0.027 -0.019 
  (-0.26) (-0.05) (-0.57) (-0.38) 
PreRelation ? 0.022 0.019 0.017 0.015 
  (0.44) (0.39) (0.35) (0.32) 
Log(Lender No.) - 0.019 0.018 0.015 0.015 
  (0.68) (0.64) (0.55) (0.55) 
NonDollar ？ -0.240** -0.245** -0.210* -0.220** 
  (-2.22) (-2.27) (-1.96) (-2.06) 
Log(GeoDist) + 0.011 0.077 0.041 0.115 
  (0.06) (0.49) (0.26) (0.73) 
Foreign Lender Country Variables 
Log(GDP per Capita) -   0.068 0.183 
    (0.31) (0.83) 
GDP Growth  -   -1.058 -0.868 
    (-0.98) (-0.75) 
PrvCredit  -   -0.000 0.000 
    (-0.04) (0.14) 
Inflation  +   0.064** 0.054** 




Impact of Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures on Interest Spreads 
 Dependent Variable: Log(IntSpread) 
 Pred. Sign  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  7.351** 6.826** 6.408** 4.498 
  (2.53) (2.41) (2.09) (1.60) 
      
Loan Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 
Adjusted R2  59.9% 59.9% 60.3% 60.2% 
 
Notes: This table presents the regression results of the impact of foreign lenders’ national cultures on interest spreads. t-
statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and 
year. The extreme values of all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The definition and 
measurement of variables are presented in Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent 








  Dependent Variable: Log(IntSpread) 
 Pred. Sign  (1)  (2) 
Panel A: Exclude Loans with Multiple Leads 
Embeddedness - -0.352***  
  (-2.88)  
Mastery ?  -0.458*** 
   (-2.72) 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,070 1,070 
Adjusted R2  58.7% 58.7% 
 
Panel B: Correct Sample Selection Bias 
Embeddedness - -0.392***  
  (-3.64)  
Mastery ?  -0.449*** 
   (-2.72) 
IMR ? -0.712*** -0.726*** 
  (-4.68) (-5.10) 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,221 1,221 
Adjusted R2  61.7% 61.6% 
 
Panel C: 2SLS Analysis (2nd Stage) 
Embeddedness (fitted) - -0.364***  
  (-2.65)  
Mastery (fitted) ?  -0.549*** 
   (-2.60) 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,221 1,221 
Adjusted R2  36.6% 36.3% 
Cragg–Donald Wald F-statistic  649.794 818.000 
Stock–Yogo critical value   60.295 19.93 
Kleibergen–Paap rk LM statistic  14.850 
(p-value = 0.001) 
15.86 
(p-value = 0.000) 
 
Notes: This table presents the results of the robustness tests. In Panel A, we exclude loans with multiple lead arrangers. In 
Panel B, we correct for sample selection bias. Panel C reports the second stage regression results of the 2SLS analysis 
treating Embeddedness and Mastery as endogenous variables. The instrumental variables used for Embeddedness are 
pathogen prevalence and pronoun drop, and the instrumental variables used for Mastery are agriculture potential and 
pronoun drop. The intercept, controls, and fixed effects are included as in Table 6 but not reported. t-statistics reported in 
parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. The extreme values 
of all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The definition and measurement of variables 








Robustness Tests: Additional Country and Lender-Specific Controls  
  Dependent Variable: Log(IntSpread) 
 Pred. Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign Lender Culture Variables 
Embeddedness - -0.373***  -0.503***  -0.749***  
  (-3.06)  (-4.42)  (-3.45)  
Mastery ?  -0.448***  -0.568***  -0.578* 
   (-2.87)  (-3.42)  (-1.93) 
Foreign Lender Formal Institutions 
Creditor Rights ? -0.033 -0.039*     
  (-1.33) (-1.69)     
Legal Enforcement ? 0.064 0.071     
  (1.29) (1.48)     
Additional Foreign Lender Country Variables 
Trade Openness -   -0.001 -0.001   
    (-1.31) (-0.76)   
CtrofCorr ?   0.347*** 0.308***   
    (2.83) (2.70)   
MCAP -   0.000 0.001   
    (0.29) (1.17)   
SysBankCrises +   0.129*** 0.102*   
    (3.59) (1.66)   
Lender Variables 
Log(Lender Size) -     -0.251*** -0.186*** 
      (-3.31) (-2.78) 
Lender ROA -     -16.018 -22.478** 
      (-1.45) (-1.99) 
Lender Leverage +     -0.204 0.029 
      (-0.08) (0.01) 
        
Intercept, Controls, 
and Fixed Effects 
 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,211 1,211 1,221 1,221 891 891 
Adjusted R2  60.3% 60.2% 60.6% 60.4% 64.2% 63.3% 
 
Notes: This table presents the robustness test results of including additional control variables. The intercept, controls, and fixed 
effects are included as in Table 6 but not reported. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected 
for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. The extreme values of all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The definition and measurement of variables are presented in Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance 





Robustness Tests: Alternative Culture Measures 
  Dependent Variable: Log(IntSpread) 
 Pred. Sign  (1)  (2) 
Panel A: Hofstede 
Individualism + 0.005**  
  (2.31)  
Masculinity ?  -0.000 
   (-0.06) 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,221 1,221 
Adjusted R2  60.0% 59.7% 
 
Panel B: WVS 
Survival + 0.194**  
  (2.09)  
Traditional -  -0.018 
  (-0.26) 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,204 1,204 
Adjusted R2  59.7% 59.6% 
 
Panel C: GLOBE 
In-group Collectivism - -0.499**  
  (-2.01)  
Assertiveness ?  -0.126*** 
   (2.95) 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed Effects  Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,203 1,203 
Adjusted R2  62.9% 63.2% 
 
Notes: This table presents the robustness test results of using alternative culture measures. Panel A uses Hofstede’s cultural 
values. Panel B uses the World Values Survey (WVS) cultural dimensions. Panel C uses the Global Leadership and 
Organizational Behaviour Effectiveness (GLOBE) cultural dimensions. The intercept, controls, and fixed effects are 
included as in Table 6 but not reported. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. The extreme values of all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. The definition and measurement of variables are presented in Table 1. *, **, *** denote 






Conditional Effects: Information Asymmetry 
















-0.478*** -0.025   
 (-3.06) (-0.09)   
Mastery   -0.691** -0.018 
   (-2.56) (-0.06) 
Low=High (Chi-squared, p-value)  0.063 0.047 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  702 519 702 519 
Adjusted R2  59.7% 66.3% 59.6% 66.4% 
 





-0.131 -0.799***   
 (-0.59) (-2.82)   
Mastery   0.104 -0.918*** 
   (0.27) (-2.99) 
Low=High (Chi-squared, p-value)  0.035 0.030 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  343 329 343 329 
Adjusted R2  64.8% 70.1% 64.8% 69.5% 
 





-0.148 -0.680***   
 (-0.65) (-2.89)   
Mastery   -0.100 -0.837** 
   (-0.29) (-2.32) 
Low=High (Chi-squared, p-value)  0.044 0.047 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  641 580 641 580 
Adjusted R2  58.6% 65.9% 58.6% 65.5% 
 
Notes: This table presents the conditional test results on the impact of information asymmetry on the relation between 
foreign lenders’ national cultures and interest rate. Information asymmetry is proxied by the presence of prior lending 
relationships between the foreign lenders and the borrower (PreRelation) in Panel A, the borrower’s information 
environment measured by the analysts’ forecast dispersion on the borrower (Forecast Dispersion) in Panel B, and the 
geographical distance between the foreign lenders and the borrower (GeoDist) in Panel C. The sample is split into low and 
high subsamples by the median of the conditional variables, or zero and one subsamples when the conditional variable is a 
dummy variable. The F-test is used to test the statistical difference in the coefficients on Embeddedness and Mastery across 
the two subsamples, and the p-value is reported. The intercept, controls, and fixed effects are included as in Table 6 but not 
reported. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by 
firm and year. The extreme values of all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The 
definition and measurement of variables are presented in Table 1. *, **, *** denote significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, 






Conditional Effects: Foreign Lender Bargaining Power 
















0.020 -0.498***   
 0.12) (-4.30)   
Mastery   0.034 -0.671*** 
   (0.15) (4.18) 
Low=High (Chi-squared, p-value)  0.049 0.044 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  618 597 618 597 
Adjusted R2  65.6% 50.1% 65.6% 51.0% 
 





-0.406** -0.943***   
 (-2.29) (-5.57)   
Mastery   -0.654** -1.132*** 
   (-2.21) (-4.74) 
Low=High (Chi-squared, p-value)  0.046 0.243 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  609 555 609 555 
Adjusted R2  55.5% 63.4% 55.4% 62.7% 
 





-0.307** -0.827***   
 (-2.68) (-4.05)   
Mastery   -0.351 -0.998*** 
   (-2.19) (-3.49) 
Low=High (Chi-squared, p-value)  0.022 0.042 
Intercept, Controls, and Fixed 
Effects 
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  878 343 878 343 
Adjusted R2  58.0% 65.9% 57.8% 70.3% 
 
Notes: This table presents the conditional test results on the impact of lender bargaining power on the relation between 
foreign lenders’ national cultures and interest rate. Lender bargaining power is proxied by the borrower’s financial 
constraints (Fin Constraints) in Panel A, Lerner index in the U.S., which is a reverse measure of banking competition 
(Lerner_US) in Panel B, and the market condition in the U.S. (MarCon_US) in Panel C. The sample is split into low and 
high subsamples by the median of the conditional variables. The F-test is used to test the statistical difference in the 
coefficients on Embeddedness and Mastery across the two subsamples, and the p-value is reported. The intercept, controls, 
and fixed effects are included as in Table 6 but not reported. t-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm and year. The extreme values of all the continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The definition and measurement of variables are presented in Table 1. *, **, *** 






Impact of Foreign Lenders’ National Cultures on Covenant Intensity 
Dependent Variable: Cov Cov_BR Cov_ FFS 
 Pred. Sign  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
Foreign Lender Culture Variables 
Embeddedness - -0.332**  -0.467**  -0.346*  
  (-2.28)  (-2.29)  (-1.92)  
Mastery ?  -0.343*  -0.495*  -0.462* 
   (-1.79)  (-1.89)  (-1.96) 
Borrower Variables 
Log(Firm Size) - -0.151*** -0.153*** -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.233*** -0.234*** 
  (-6.88) (-6.94) (-8.32) (-8.35) (-8.22) (-8.26) 
Leverage + 0.358*** 0.365*** 0.577*** 0.591*** 0.572*** 0.579*** 
  (2.79) (2.82) (3.72) (3.76) (4.00) (4.03) 
IntCov - -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
  (-0.75) (-0.78) (-0.61) (-0.62) (-0.28) (-0.32) 
CurRatio - 0.028 0.026 0.032 0.029 0.011 0.009 
  (1.14) (1.05) (1.05) (0.95) (0.38) (0.30) 
Mar to Book - -0.005 -0.006 -0.084** -0.085** -0.101** -0.103** 
  (-0.16) (-0.20) (-2.12) (-2.15) (-2.53) (-2.58) 
Tangibility - 0.146 0.132 0.185 0.168 0.183 0.173 
  (1.05) (0.95) (1.00) (0.91) (1.14) (1.08) 
ROA - -0.147 -0.138 -0.455 -0.440 -0.452* -0.440 
  (-0.58) (-0.54) (-1.59) (-1.52) (-1.69) (-1.64) 
σ(ROA) + 0.180 0.197 -0.126 -0.108 -0.154 -0.137 
  (0.71) (0.78) (-0.36) (-0.31) (-0.49) (-0.44) 
Z-Score - -0.003 -0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.001 -0.001 
  (-0.23) (-0.24) (-0.41) (-0.43) (-0.23) (-0.23) 
MarCon_US + 0.056 0.058 0.066 0.069 0.099 0.103 
  (1.05) (1.09) (0.94) (0.99) (1.51) (1.58) 
Loan Variables 
Log(Maturity) + -0.013 -0.012 0.077 0.079 0.132** 0.134** 
  (-0.34) (-0.30) (1.45) (1.49) (2.49) (2.52) 
Log(Loan Size) - -0.026 -0.023 -0.060* -0.056* -0.076*** -0.074** 
  (-1.03) (-0.91) (-1.87) (-1.75) (-2.62) (-2.54) 
InstLoan + 0.344*** 0.347*** 0.459*** 0.464*** 0.478*** 0.481*** 
  (6.37) (6.38) (7.14) (7.14) (7.79) (7.83) 
Revolver ? 0.022 0.024 -0.015 -0.012 -0.014 -0.012 
  (0.57) (0.63) (-0.34) (-0.26) (-0.32) (-0.28) 
PPP + 0.558*** 0.556*** 0.621*** 0.618*** 0.544*** 0.543*** 
  (11.42) (11.35) (10.34) (10.23) (9.87) (9.85) 
LeadRep ? 0.008 0.014 0.053 0.059 0.062 0.069 
  (0.17) (0.30) (0.86) (0.95) (1.12) (1.24) 
PreRelation ? 0.032 0.031 0.052 0.050 0.084* 0.081 
  (0.72) (0.69) (0.94) (0.90) (1.67) (1.61) 
Log(Lender No.) - 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.123*** 0.121*** 0.097*** 0.096*** 
  (4.82) (4.75) (3.31) (3.25) (2.80) (2.74) 
NonDollar ? 0.157 0.153 0.187 0.181 0.108 0.102 
  (1.61) (1.56) (1.54) (1.49) (0.94) (0.89) 
Log(GeoDist) + 0.291 0.373** 0.585** 0.697*** 0.505** 0.562*** 
  (1.52) (2.00) (2.36) (2.93) (2.21) (2.58) 
Foreign Lender Country Variables 
Log(GDP per Capita) ? 0.281 0.392 0.056 0.229 -0.139 -0.013 
  (0.91) (1.23) (0.16) (0.63) (-0.48) (-0.05) 
GDP Growth  ? 0.055** 0.048** 0.061** 0.051* 0.042* 0.039* 
  (2.38) (2.18) (2.17) (1.90) (1.68) (1.65) 
PrvCredit  ? 0.002 0.002 0.003* 0.003** 0.002* 0.003* 
  (1.55) (1.62) (1.95) (2.00) (1.66) (1.77) 
Inflation  ? 0.063*** 0.055** 0.066** 0.055* 0.066** 0.060** 
  (2.82) (2.54) (2.16) (1.89) (2.39) (2.24) 
57 
 
Intercept  -4.282 -6.517 -7.166 -10.377** -4.847 -6.450 
  (-0.97) (-1.54) (-1.33) (-1.98) (-1.03) (-1.41) 
        
Loan Purpose  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year Effects  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
No. of Observations  1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 1,221 
Adjusted R2  27.4% 27.4% 27.5% 27.4% 19.7% 19.7% 
 
Notes: This table presents the Poisson regression results of the impact of foreign lenders’ national cultures on covenant intensity. 
z-statistics reported in parentheses are based on standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered by firm. The 
extreme values of all the continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. The definition and measurement of 






The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author 
upon reasonable request.  
 
